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Abstract 
This paper examines the links between productivity and social welfare, with an application to 
the banking industry. It models spatial price competition between bank branches jointly with 
banks’ decisions on the opening or closing of branches based on profit expectations. The 
model predicts that more productive banks set lower (higher) interest rates on loans (deposits) 
and increase their market share through both higher demand per branch and a larger network 
of branches. Specifically, the paper i) uses a new measure of bank productivity; ii) provides a 
productivity differences-based explanation of the distance between bank branches and bank 
customers; and iii) shows how  the intensity of market competition may be unaffected when the 
number of banks decreases, provided that banks continue expanding their branch network. 
The empirical implementation of the model uses Spanish banks over the period 1993-2007 
and it confirms the theoretical predictions of the paper. 
Keywords: banking spatial competition, bank branch productivity, interest rates, branch 
dynamics, bank economic profits. 
JEL Classification: E43, G21, L11, O30, R32. 
 
 
  
Resumen 
Este trabajo examina los vínculos entre productividad y bienestar, en una aplicación para la industria 
bancaria. El trabajo modeliza la competencia espacial en precios entre oficinas bancarias, junto con 
la decisión de los bancos de abrir o cerrar oficinas según las expectativas de beneficio. El modelo 
predice que los bancos más productivos ofrecerán un menor (mayor) tipo de interés en los 
préstamos (depósitos) e incrementarán su cuota de mercado gracias a su mayor demanda por 
oficina y mayor red de oficinas. El trabajo: i) utiliza una nueva medida de productividad de los 
bancos; ii) proporciona una explicación, basada en las diferencias de productividad, de la distancia 
entre oficinas y clientes de los servicios bancarios, y iii) muestra que la intensidad de la competencia 
puede verse inalterada a pesar de que disminuya el número de bancos en el sistema, siempre que 
estos mantengan la expansión de sus oficinas. La aplicación empírica del modelo utiliza bancos 
españoles durante el período 1993-2007 y confirma las predicciones teóricas. 
Palabras clave: competencia espacial en banca, productividad de la oficina bancaria, tipos de 
interés, dinámica de oficinas, beneficios económicos en banca. 
Códigos JEL: E43, G21, L11, O30, R32. 
 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 7 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1426 
1 Introduction 
Productivity growth is at the core of economic progress. Most of the productivity research 
focuses on what determines the observed heterogeneity in productivity at the micro and 
macro levels (Syverson, 2011). However, much less is known about the channels through 
which productivity improvement translates into social welfare.  
This paper is about productivity and social welfare in the banking industry. It provides 
empirical evidence from Spanish banks during the period 1993-2007. We model a two-stage 
spatial competition process. In a first step, bank-branches decide on the interest rates of 
loans and deposits and the number of branches are fixed. In a second step, banks adjust 
their numbers of branches until the industry economic profits converge to zero. In the short–
run, more productive bank-branches set lower (higher) interest rates of loans (deposits) and 
capture larger market shares in the markets of loans and deposits. In the long–run, more 
productive banks end up with a larger network of branches than less productive ones. 
Through competition, productivity growth is translated into lower (higher) interest rates of 
loans (deposits) and larger branches-network. 
In this set up, higher productivity contributes to social welfare through three different 
channels: i) market prices of differentiated banking products are closer to their marginal costs 
(lower dead-weight losses from market power); ii) more customers benefit of more favorable 
interest rates because, in equilibrium, more productive bank-branches capture larger market 
share; iii) higher customer accessibility to banking services through a larger network of 
branches that reduces the average distance to the bank-branch.   
The theoretical model is a derivation of a standard Salop (1979) model in which we 
introduce differences in branch productivity. The theoretical predictions derived from the 
model relate the bank-branch productivity with the short-term equilibrium prices, with the 
market shares of loans and deposits and with the number of branches in the long-term 
equilibrium. The theoretical model takes the bank-branch as the competition unit where 
pricing decisions are taken. As in Salop (1979), the transportation costs differentiate the 
otherwise homogeneous products, the Nash equilibrium prices are not equal to the marginal 
costs, and the gross margin is inversely related to the size of the branches network (more 
branches implies lower average distance and less product differentiation). The bank-branch 
incurs a fixed cost for opening and operating and, thus, some degree of market power (i.e. 
price above marginal cost) is needed to avoid negative economic profits in the equilibrium. 
The size of the branches network and the gross profit margins adjusts through entry and exit 
decisions until the expected economic profits of one additional branch equals zero.  
The main predictions of the model are tested using data from Spanish banks during 
the period 1993-2007, just before the recent financial and banking crisis. The estimated 
productivity of each bank-branch and year is computed following the methodology posited in 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), using a production function that deploys labor and IT capital as 
variable inputs and the capacity of the branch as a fixed input (Martín-Oliver et al, 2013). The 
econometric estimations confirm the predictions of the model. Industry productivity gains 
translate into lower (higher) interest of loans (deposits). At the same time, more productive 
banks charge lower (higher) interest rates of loans (deposits). We also find that more 
productive banks capture larger market share in both markets, deposits and loans, and earn 
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higher economic profits per bank-branch. As for the dynamics of branches, empirical 
evidence supports the prediction that banks’ opening and closing decisions are taken 
according to the expectations of future economic profit per branch at the industry level. 
Additionally, more productive banks expand their network of branches more rapidly, 
consistent with the prediction that higher productivity will be associated with higher profits 
also for the new branches. The prediction that branches entry and exit dynamics will continue 
until profit expectations of further entries are driven to zero is not rejected by the data. The 
evidence also shows that banks that the least productive ones are candidates to be merged 
or acquired, as it could be reasonably expected. Therefore, competition drives industry 
restructuring, even in normal times.  
The paper contributes to three main strings of research in banking literature: i) why 
distance matters; ii) competition and market power; and iii) productivity and profits. Distance 
matters in the banking industry because it affects transportation and information acquisition 
costs, particularly in the loans market (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 
2005; Hauswald and Marquez, 2006; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010). In environments of 
information asymmetry between borrowers and banks, the average distance between the 
locations of banks and the locations of borrower has been explained as a function of 
incentives of banks to invest in information acquisition (Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010), and 
incentives to invest in information technologies (Petersen and Rajan, 2002). In this paper, we 
assume complete and symmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Under these 
assumptions, average distance between suppliers and customers of bank services is also 
determined endogenously but this time as a function of differences in productivity among 
banks. This result suggests that controlling for productivity differences will be particularly 
relevant in research on distance and interest rates of loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005).  
Although the introduction of uncertainty and asymmetric information in the loans 
market is beyond the reach of this paper, the model offers some insights on the relationship 
between productivity and risk exposure of banks. Models of risk taking behavior in banks’ 
loans decisions predict less risk exposure of bank loans in markets with lower mark-ups in the 
interests of loans (Matutes and Vives, 2000; Allen and Gale, 2004; Repullo, 2004; Boyd and 
De Nicolo, 2005; Freixas and Ma, 2014). The size of the mark-ups depends generally on the 
degree of market competition. Our model predicts that, for a given level of industry 
competition (Nash behavior), more productive banks will charge lower mark ups in their 
interest rates of loans. Consequently, a negative association would also be expected between 
productivity and the risk of the loan portfolio. At the same time, since more productive banks 
capture higher market share, the average distance between borrowers and banks will 
increase with productivity differences. If higher average distance implies higher information 
asymmetry between banks and borrowers, then productivity may be positively associated 
with credit risk1. Some preliminary evidence indicates that the ratio of non-performing loans 
increases with productivity in our sample data.  
                                                                          
1. Models on the relationship between competition and risk taking of banks in lending decisions ignore the quantitative 
effects as they assume that demand of loans is independent of price. Other literature on competition and risk taking by 
banks argues that higher competition will lower the economic value of banks and, since banks will have less to loose if 
they go bankrupt, then competition will induce more risk taking behavior (Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000; Salas and 
Saurina, 2003; Albertazzi and Gambacorta, 2009; Jiménez, López and Saurina, 2013). In this paper we assume Nash 
competitive behaviour of banks all along the exposition so we cannot test for differences in the intensity of competition 
(for example allowing for collusive behaviour among banks). Finally, productivity may be negatively associated with risk 
taking if more productive banks are also more efficient in monitoring and screening the credit quality of borrowers 
(Fiordelisi et al. 2011, Nemanja et al. 2012). 
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The paper is also related with the literature on price and non-price competition in 
banking, either statically (Berger and Hannan, 1998, Pinho 2000, Carbó and Rodríguez, 
2007; Carbo et al, 2009; Mirzaei et al., 2013) or dynamically, especially through branching 
opening and closing (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ho and Ishii, 2011; Aguirregabiria et al., 
2012). Our model differs from standard static price and non-price competition in that markets 
are defined spatially and the bank-branch, not the whole bank, is the basic decision unit. 
Product differentiation in the demand side is the consequence of differences in distance costs 
to alternative bank-branches. Differentiation, in turns, determines market power of each bank-
branch. The competitive behaviour of banks is that which leads to a Nash equilibrium 
solution; collusive behaviour is not contemplated. In the supply side, bank differences are 
limited to heterogeneous productivity. The referenced papers on branches dynamics model 
the market equilibrium taking the regional market as the unit of analysis.  
Our paper models the expansion of the network of branches from the point of view 
of the profit expectations of individual banks. In this respect, we explain the equilibrium 
number of branches for a bank as a function of its relative productivity when industry profit 
opportunities are exhausted. Some relevant predictions from our analysis are: i) market power 
does not necessarily imply positive economic profits when, as in our case, there are fixed 
costs of opening a new bank-branch; ii) the industry dynamics of competition with economic 
profits converging to zero is compatible with the reduction in the number of banks (through 
mergers and acquisitions) as long as surviving banks open new branches to capture profit 
opportunities.  
Finally, our paper contributes to the literature that explain differences in profits of 
banks as a function of the differences in their productive efficiency (Berger et al., 2004; Berger 
and Mester, 2003; Fiordelisi, 2007; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). First, the paper uses a unique 
measure of productivity (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) obtained from a production function of 
banking services with labour and IT capital as input variables. To the best of our knowledge 
this is the first paper that uses this productivity measure to explain heterogeneity in banks 
profits. Second, the paper explains differences in economic profits of banks considering both 
differences in margins and differences in volumes (market shares). Third, short-term bank-
branch economic profits are measured in absolute terms because this is the definition of the 
dependent variable that comes out directly from the theoretical model. Forth, we integrate in a 
single model the static and the dynamic relationships between banks’ profits and productivity. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2, we formalize banks 
behaviour in a simple model where the relevant business unit is the bank-branch, while the 
number of branches is determined industry wide by opening and closing decisions. Section 3 
describes the data sources and provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables, 
including the productivity measurement. Section 4 shows the results on the effects of 
productivity on the interest rates, the demands of loans and deposits and the profit level of 
banks, as well as the tests on the long-term converge of profits to zero as a consequence of 
the banks’ branches dynamics. Finally, the conclusions section summarizes the main results 
of the paper and their implications.  
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2 Production, demand and profit functions  
In this section, we present the industry competition model and formulate the main hypotheses that 
will be tested with data from Spanish banks. The model includes the description of the operating 
technology, the demands and profit functions of banks and the market equilibrium solution for 
both, the short-run, in which the number of branches is constant (static equilibrium), and for the 
long-run evolution of the number of branches and of the industry profits (dynamic equilibrium). 
2.1 Production and cost function 
The modeling of the production function of banks follows Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás 
(2008). The production function for the representative bank branch i, is given by: 
 
[1] 
The output of the bank branch is equal to the sum of loans (L) and deposits (D). Each 
branch has a fixed capacity q determined by the physical space, and a variable capacity that 
depends on the quantities of variable inputs, the number of employees per branch (E) and the IT 
capital per branch (IK)2. Parameter A represents the level of productivity of the branch. Martín-
Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008) estimate [1] with data from Spanish banks. They find that; i) 
output does not vary with the physical capital of the bank, confirming that physical capital is a 
quasi-fixed input tied to the capacity of the branch; ii) the null hypothesis of F( ) being linear 
homogeneous (i.e. it exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and IT capital inputs ) is not 
rejected; iii) the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale at the bank level cannot be rejected. 
These results justify the output of the bank being written as the product of the output per branch 
times the number of bank branches, and also the treatment of physical capital as a fixed input. 
Taking into account [1] and the linear homogeneity condition, the minimum total 
variable cost of producing output (L+D) per branch is given by: 
 
[2] 
 
The term  is the per-unit variable production cost of bank i; the 
function  is increasing and linear homogeneous in the input prices of labor, w, 
and of IT capital services, ccIT. 
The current market price per unit of capacity of the branch is pK so the investment in 
capacity per branch is pkqi=Ki. If ccK is the user cost of physical branch-capital (equal to 
interest rate plus the corresponding depreciation rate) the fixed cost in period t of the 
investment per branch is equal to ccKKi 
                                                                          
2. On the upward bias in bank-level productivity estimates when IT expenditures are ignored see Koetter and Noth (2013).  
i
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i A
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),( ITi ccwv
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2.2 The demand functions 
We consider a spatial market like in Salop (1979); bank branches are symmetrically located 
around a circumference of perimeter 1; customers are uniformly located in each point of the 
circumference so the total size of the market is normalized to 1. The number of branches is 
initially given and equal to N, so the distance between branches is 1/N. Deposits and loans 
markets are taken to be independent, so there are no bundling decisions on loans and 
deposits. We will denote by sub indexes L and D to loans and deposits, respectively. 
Therefore, the interest rates of bank-branch i will be riL, riD, for loans and deposits, 
respectively. The notation for the representative competing bank-branch is, rL. rD. A customer 
in the circumference located at distance xi of branch i will compare the cost of a loan from 
branch i with the cost of the loan from the branch of the neighbor competitor. If the cost per 
unit of distance is, the distance xi for which a borrower will be indifferent between the two 
branches satisfies the condition: 
 
[3] 
From [3] and taking into account that there are customers at both sides of the 
branch, the demand for loans per branch for bank branch i and for the representative 
competitor are: 
,
[4] 
.
[5] 
Repeating the calculation for deposits, the resulting demand functions are: 
 
[6] 
 
[7] 
Banks in our model face the constraint that total investments must be equal to the 
funds available to finance operations. Loans and fixed assets invested in the branches 
consume funds while deposits provide funds to finance assets. Additionally, banks have 
access to financial markets where they can borrow and lend at a given interest rate r. If M is 
the amount of market funds per branch lent to or borrowed from the financial markets, then 
the balance constraint of supply of funds equal to demand is formulated as follows: 
 
 [8] MDKL 
  
 NrrrrD iDDiDDD ,
  
 NrrrrD DiDDiDiD ,
    
 NrrxN12rrL LiLiiLLL ,
  
 Nrrx2rrL iLLiLiLiL ,
)( iLiiL xN1rxr  
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2.3 Short-term profit maximization 
The profit per branch is equal to the difference between the revenues from loans granted by 
the branch and the financial and operating costs. The financial costs include the interests paid 
on deposits and the costs from market finance. The operating costs gather the variable costs 
associated to labor and IT capital services and the fixed costs from the investment on 
capacity. Taking into account [8] and after arranging the terms, the respective profit functions 
per branch of bank i and of the competing representative bank can be written as:  
 
[9] 
, 
[10] 
where L( ) and D( ) functions are given by equations [4] to [7] above. 
Each bank chooses the interest rates of loans and deposits that maximize profits. 
The Nash equilibrium solutions for bank i, are given by: 
 
[11] 
and 
 
[12] 
 
Equations [11] and [12] provide the interest rates and the volumes of loans and 
deposits at the short-term market equilibrium, for each bank-branch in its local market. 
Equilibrium interest rates of loans and deposits increase with the market interest rate r. 
Interest rates of loans (deposits) will be lower (higher) in markets with higher density of 
branches (N) and in markets with lower (higher) perceived differentiation (. Within a given 
geographical market, the interest rate of loans (deposits) charged by a given bank will 
increase (decrease) with the weighted average of the per-unit operating costs of the bank (ci) 
and the per-unit operating cost of its competitors (cL) (weights of 2/3 and 1/3, respectively). 
Since per-unit operating costs are inversely related with productivity A, interest rates of loans 
(deposits) are lower (higher) in industries with higher average productivity of banks.  
The loans and deposits per bank branch in the equilibrium are smaller in markets 
with higher density of branches. In equilibrium, bank-branches with higher productivity (lower 
operating unit costs) have a higher market share in a given spatial. Substituting the equilibrium 
values of prices and quantities from [11] and [12] in [9], the maximized volume of profit for 
bank i is equal to: 
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[13] 
 
Profit of bank-branch i increases with the own productivity relative to that of competing banks 
(as determinant of unit costs c). Productivity gains increases profits through two effects, 
through the increase of the gross profit margin (  increases with Ai from [11]) and 
also because it implies more volume of demand per branch. Profit per branch is higher if the 
bank operates in markets with higher buyers’ perceived differentiation and/or in markets with 
lower density of branches.  
2.4 The dynamics of bank branches and of economic profits 
The time dynamics of the number of branches of a given bank will depend on the profit 
expectations for the whole banking industry, and on the own productivity of the bank relative 
to that of its competitors as determinant of its own profits from the branch expansion. The 
dynamics of the change in the size of the branch network of bank i is then modelled as 
follows:  
 
[14] 
where Nit is the number of branches of bank i in year t,  is the expected profit per 
branch for the whole banking industry in year t, and RAit is a measure of relative productivity 
of bank i. The change in the number of branches of bank i will increase with the industry 
profits expectation and with the relative productivity (comparative advantage) of the bank, i.e., 
we expect β1>0 and β2>0.3 
The expansion of the branch network will continue as long as banks anticipate 
positive economic profits from opening a new branch. As the number of branches 
increases, the unit margin, the demand per branch and, consequently, the gross profits 
decrease. At some point, these gross profits will not be high enough to cover the fixed 
costs of opening a new branch and the expansion will stop. We model the dynamics of 
profits per bank-branch resulting from the evolution on the number of branches as an 
autoregressive equation: 
 [15] 
The long-run equilibrium with a stationary number of branches requires that 
economic profits per branch converge to zero. This requires that E(α0)=0 and E(α1)<1. 
Equation [15] can be modified to allow for idiosyncratic effects of each bank, which will 
determine whether convergence on bank profits is conditional or unconditional. 
                                                                          
3. In the Salop type model of spatial competition the equilibrium number of branches in the market with free entry is 
higher than it should be from welfare maximization criteria; this implies inefficient equilibrium interest rates of loans and 
deposits too. The socially inefficient number of branches and interest rates from free entry is not discussed in the paper. 
See Berger et al. (1997) for a different approach to efficient banks’ branches expansion.  
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In this formulation the dynamics of branches and profits are both modelled at the 
bank level and for an industry-wide zero profit condition. The underlying assumption is that if 
there are any profitable opportunities in any regional market to open new branches, it will 
have a positive impact on the average industry profit and, thus, banks will have incentives to 
open new branches. When all the profitable opportunities across markets are exhausted, then 
the expected profit per branch at the industry level will tend to zero. This approach is different 
from that in other papers that model equilibrium in the number of branches at the local market 
level (Cohen and Mazzeo, 2007; Ho and Ishii, 2011; Aguirregabiria et al., 2012). 
2.5 Main predictions of the model 
Here, we synthesize the predictions derived from the model discussed in this section that we 
will test empirically. 
P1: The productivity determines the performance of banks:  
a) Interest rates of loans (deposits) charged by a bank decrease (increase) with the 
difference in productivity of the bank with respect to competitors and decrease 
(increase) with the average productivity in the market. 
b) Loans and deposits per branch increase with the relative difference of productivity of 
the bank with respect to its rivals. 
c) In the short-term, profits per bank-branch increase with the relative productivity of 
banks.  
P2: The dynamics of branches, [14], is summarized as follows: 
a) The number of branches of each bank increases over time with the relative 
difference in productivity with respect to rivals at the beginning of the period, and 
with the expectations on future profits of the average branch in the market.  
P3.The dynamics of industry profits [15] 
a) For the whole banking industry, average economic profit per branch converges 
towards zero over time.   
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1426 
3 Database and variables 
The database refers to Spanish banks over the pre-crisis period of 1993-2007. We use 
unconsolidated balance sheets and income statement data for each bank and year, with 
merged banks treated as a new entity. Since data are bank-level and the model is formulated 
at the branch level, we assume that the bank production is equal to the product of a 
representative bank-branch times the number of branches of the bank. This representation of 
the bank is supported by previous research where, for the same database, the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale both at the branch- and at the bank-level could not be rejected 
(Martin-Oliver and Salas-Fumás, 2008).  
We now describe the calculation of each of the main variables used in the empirical 
analysis and provide descriptive statistics on each of them. Appendix A gather together the 
definitions of the main variables used in the analysis. 
3.1 Measurement of productivity 
The productivity Ait for bank i in year t is estimated as in Martín-Oliver et al. (2013). The 
banking firm is modelled following a production approach where the production function is 
defined at the branch level according to [1]. Banks deploy labour, IT and physical capital 
services as inputs to produce a multiple-output that includes the collection of deposits, the 
delivery of loans and the provision of bank services related with them (liquidity provision, 
payment services, screening applicants, monitoring borrowers, etc). The production function 
for the representative technology at the branch level is estimated with the methodology 
developed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) that corrects for the simultaneity bias in the OLS 
estimation due to the correlation between the (unobserved) level of productivity and the 
amount of labour used in production4.  
The “raw” measure of productivity is calculated as the difference between the 
observed output and the predicted output according to the estimated parameters of the 
production function and the observed quantities of inputs. This raw measure of productivity 
may vary across banks for other reasons than differences in the TFP parameter Ai that is the 
relevant productivity from the model (Martín-Oliver et al 2013). To obtain an estimate of the 
TFP parameter we decompose the raw productivity measure as follows:     
 [16] 
The productivity of bank i is separated into two components: the average 
productivity for the whole banking industry (At), and the differential of the productivity of bank i 
                                                                          
4. The alternative to the production approach is the intermediation approach, where deposits are included among the 
inputs, together with labor and capital. We believe that the production approach provides a more accurate estimate of 
the productivity of banks because banks also consume labor and capital services inputs in the production of deposits 
and related liquidity services. Moreover, the deposits of banks are determined endogenously from banks’ competition. 
The production approach has also advantages in the empirical side. For example, it only requires information on the 
quantities of input and output variables, whereas the estimation of the cost function also requires information on input 
prices, which are often difficult to measure (i.e., pricing risk), or are determined endogenously from the competition 
process (interest rates of deposits). Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2008) are the first to estimate the production 
function (1), and therefore the productivity of banks, with IT capital as a variable input and physical capital as a fixed one, 
and using the by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) methodology.  
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in year t with respect to the industry average (Ait). The vector of control variables (Xit) accounts 
for other sources of heterogeneity different from productivity. The industry productivity (At) is 
estimated as the coefficient for the time dummy variable of year t in [16], while the difference 
with respect to this mean for bank i in period t (Ait) is obtained as the residual of the 
estimation. Since the “raw” productivity measure is expressed in logs, the industry and the 
bank productivity variables are also in logs. 
Figure 1A shows the distribution of the estimated productivity of banks and years for 
the whole sample period. The distribution is centered on zero because estimated 
productivities are the residuals from equation [16]. We observe that productivity is 
heterogeneous across banks (no degenerated distribution) and that the distribution around 
the mean is quite symmetric. The estimated coefficients for the time dummy variables in 
equation [16] that give the time trend in average industry productivity are shown in the last 
column of Table 2. We observe a steady growth of around 3% a year and an accumulated 
growth of 45.8% for the 15 years of the sample. 
Since the short-term equilibrium solutions and the equation of the dynamics of 
branches are functions of the bank’s productivity relative to its competitors, we define two 
dummy variables that classify banks according to their relative level of productivity. The 
variable takes the value of 1 for all banks-years whose level of 
productivity is lower than the productivity corresponding to the 25th percentile of the 
distribution of competing banks of competing banks in the same market.  
The variable takes the value of 1 for banks-years with 
productivity above the 75th percentile of the distribution in the year. The distribution of 
productivity for the competitors of bank i is obtained from the estimated productivity of those 
banks that compete in the relevant market for bank i. We define the relevant market of a bank 
as all the provinces in which the bank has at least five branches5. Figure 1B presents the 
distribution of productivity for the banks that are located below the 25th percentile and above 
the 75th percentile of the total distribution of productivity. 
3.2 Interest rates 
The interest rates of loans and deposits for bank i in year t (rLit and rDit, respectively) are 
interest rates charged by banks in new operations, i.e. marginal interest rates. The interest of 
loans is the weighted average of the interest rates charged in the different types of loans (i.e. 
business, consumer and mortgage loans), using as weights the volume of the operations. 
Similarly, the interest rates of deposits are the weighted average of the interest rates paid on 
current and saving deposits6. Since the data of marginal interest rates has a monthly basis, 
we take averages of the twelve monthly values available for each year to obtain yearly data. 
Figure 2 characterizes the evolution of the distributions of the banks’ interest rates of 
loans (panel A) and deposits (panel B). In both cases, we observe a decreasing trend that is 
                                                                          
5. With the minimum of five branches we exclude markets where banks have just an institutional presence (Spanish 
banks often have a representative office in large cities but without relevant retail banking activity). In the empirical analysis 
we find that the results are not sensitive to the threshold in the definition of the relevant market, like minimum number of 
branches equal to three. 
6. The use of interest rates of loans and deposits for the transactions in year t has advantages over the more usual 
estimation of average interest rates equal to the interests charged on loans in year t divided by the stock of loans at the 
beginning of the period. The reason is that operating efficiency is calculated for year t so it is relevant for the transactions 
performed along that year. The ratio of flows over stocks combines values of the variables in the numerator and the 
denominator that result from transactions along several years.  
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parallel to the evolution of the interbank market interest rate, whose time trend has been very 
much affected by Spain joining the EMU in 1999. Average and median values of interest rates 
are similar in both loans and deposits although, in the case of loans, the median is slightly 
smaller than the mean in the years from 2002 to 2007, suggesting a fatter tail of the 
distribution of interest rates for higher values of the variable. The coefficient of variation shows 
an upward trend in both, loans and deposits, which indicates that the relative dispersion in 
banks’ interest rates of loans and of deposits has been increasing over time. Since the 
standard deviation remains rather stable over time, the time trend observed in the coefficient 
of variation is due to the decreasing trend in average interest rates. In spite of the level of 
interest rates having steadily decreased over time, the relative differences with respect the 
average have become larger.  
3.3 Volumes of loans and deposits per branch 
The volumes of loans and deposits per branch of bank i in year t (Lit and Dit, respectively) are 
calculated dividing the respective stocks of loans and deposits at the end of year t by the 
number of branches of the bank at the end of t. The stocks of loans and deposits are valued 
at constant prices to control for time variations due to pure monetary effects. The constant 
prices calculation follows the permanent inventory approach with depreciation equal to zero 
and price inflation equal to the growth rate of the consumer price index.  
The descriptive statistics of the volume of loans and deposits and per branch are 
shown in Table 1. Both have dramatically increased during the sample period. The average 
has been multiplied by a factor of 2.3 in the case of loans and by 2.4 in the case of deposits. 
The representative branch granted 35,850 thousands Euros of loans and collected 27,350 
thousands Euros of deposits in 2007. The magnitude of this raise is replicated in all the 
percentiles of the distribution of loans and deposits (not shown), consistent with a general 
increment of the volume of loans and deposits per branch that shifts the distributions towards 
the right. 
3.4 Economic profits per branch 
Banks make decisions to maximize economic profits and if the decision unit is the bank 
branch then the economic profits in our analysis are expressed in profits per branch. Other 
papers measure profits in terms of rates of return (Bourke, 1989; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Mirzaei et al. 2013)7 but banks do not make decisions to maximize rates of returns but to 
maximize absolute profits. 
Our estimate of economic profits is calculated from accounting profits with some 
adjustments. These adjustments consist on excluding expenditures in IT and advertising from 
the costs of the year and considering them as investment flows that are capitalized and 
depreciated yearly at depreciation rates proposed in the literature. In addition, the opportunity 
cost of equity, which is not considered as a financial cost in the calculation of accounting 
profits, is counted as a cost in the calculation of the economic profit8 Economic profits are 
first calculated at the bank level. Next, the economic profits of the bank in year t are divided 
by the number of branches to obtain the economic profit per branch of bank i in year t.  
                                                                          
7. One exception is Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009) that use accounting profits in levels. Notice also that total assets 
or equity used in the calculations of ROA and ROE are themselves endogenous variables so their determinants will affect 
the calculated values of rates of return. 
8. For a more detailed description of the calculation of economic profits of banks see Martín-Oliver et al. (2007). 
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Table 1 shows the evolution of the economic profits per bank during the sample 
period. Economic profits show a cyclical profile with negative average and median values until 
1997 and positive afterwards. Figure 3 shows the frequencies distribution of economic profits 
per branch for all banks and years in the sample data. Figure 3A corresponds to the 
economic profits divided by the equity of the bank (relative economic profits) and Figure 3B to 
the volume of profits per branch. For both variables the mean and the median are centred on 
zero; on average for the whole time period and all banks, we observe that banks’ net income 
just compensates for the opportunity cost of equity. This is consistent with a dynamics of 
branching that drives the industry economic profits to zero. 
The empirical model about the dynamics of the branches of bank i in period t 
(Equation 14), includes as explanatory variable the “expected” profits per branch for year t+1 
in the relevant market, denoted as . Since banks can open new branches in any 
province of the country and we model the number of branches in the current market and in 
the potential new ones, the relevant market for the decision of expansion of branches is the 
whole national market. More particularly, we estimate  for the average bank of the 
whole banking industry in the following manner. The expected values of the numerator and of 
the denominator,  and , are estimated separately for every bank and year using a 
panel-data model that relates the dependent variable with the lagged dependent variable, the 
interbank interest rate, the GDP growth and the inflation rate. Next, by aggregating at the 
country level the predictions for all the banks in each year, we obtain the series for the 
average bank in the whole banking industry,  and . In order to assess the impact 
of the prediction error, we estimate  and using two approaches. First, we run the 
estimations every year using only the information available at t. And second, the estimations 
at every year are run using all the information of the whole sample period.9  
Finally, we calculate the average economic profits per branch for the whole banking 
industry in year t (ΠMt) dividing the sum of economic profits for all banks at t by the sum of the 
number of branches of all banks also at t. The average economic profit per branch for the 
whole industry is the relevant variable in equation [15].   
3.5 Number of branches  
The dependent variable in Equation [14] is the first-difference of the number of branches of bank 
i at t, Nit. The variable number of branches for each bank and year is directly taken from the 
database on banks’ statistics available at the Bank of Spain. Table 2 shows the evolution in the 
number of banks and some descriptive statistics of the number of branches. The number of 
banks has decreased over time, giving as a result higher market concentration at the bank level. 
However, the average number of branches per bank has dramatically increased. This raise in 
the number of branches affects all percentiles of the distribution, though the growth in larger 
banks is more acute: banks in the 25th and 50th percentiles of the size distribution present a 
cumulative growth rate in their number of branches of around 94%, whereas banks in the 75th 
percentile have a growth rate of 133%. The whole pattern of branches expansion reflects the 
                                                                          
9. The predictive power of both approaches is measured with a regression that relates the observed profits per branch 
with the individual predictions obtained from the two models. When the explanatory variable is the predicted profits per 
branch with perfect information (using all the observations of the sample), the R2 is 49.59%, whereas it is reduced to 
5.8% when we use the profits estimated with sequential information. In both cases, when we aggregate the numerators 
and denominators, the average profits per branch follow a similar pattern than the observed profits. 
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growth of the network of branches triggered by the 1988 regulatory change, which removed all 
restrictions to the geographical extension of saving banks. 
The market equilibrium conditions in interest rates of loans and deposits and in 
volumes of loans and deposits per branch depend on the number of branches in the relevant 
market. As indicated above, we define the relevant market for a bank as the sum of all the 
provinces where it has at least 5 branches. However the number of bank branches in each 
province is endogenous according to the model, since banks decide opening or closing 
branches in each province. To reduce the possible estimation biases we substitute the total 
number of branches from all banks in the relevant market, by an estimate of the size of the 
relevant market, equal to the sum of GDPs of each province that belongs to the relevant 
market of bank i, GDPMarket. 
3.6 Other explanatory variables 
The model presented in this paper assumes certainty and symmetric information in credit 
markets. In reality, uncertainty and information asymmetries exist and credit risk is a relevant 
variable in lending decisions by banks. Banks can differ in their willingness to take risk and 
invest in information to assess the credit worthiness of the borrowers. In order to account for 
the heterogeneity in the credit risk policy of banks in the sample, we add the variable ratio of 
loan loss provisions over total assets (i.e. LLP/Assets) among the explanatory variables in the 
models of determinants of interest rates of loans. Banks with higher loan loss provisions can 
be expected to take higher credit risk ex-ante and charge higher risk premium in the interests 
of their loans. Thus, we expect a positive effect of this measure of credit risk in the interest 
rate of loans.  
For a given density of demand in the spatial market, higher volume of loans per 
branch also implies higher average distance between borrowers and bank branches in the 
particular market. If the information of lenders on the credit quality of the borrowers decreases 
with distance (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Degryse and Ongena, 2005; Hauswald and 
Marquez, 2006; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010) then one can expect that higher volume of 
loans per branch will be associated with higher credit risk, since higher volume implies higher 
average distance between borrowers and lenders. Thus, our empirical model for the volume 
of loans per branch includes the variable LLP/Assets as a explanatory variable to account for 
this effect. If we find a positive estimated coefficient of this variable, the result could be 
interpreted as evidence that distance matters for information and risk reasons too.  
Other sources of heterogeneity among banks that are unobservable and time 
invariant are captured in the empirical model by time invariant fixed effects.  
In the empirical model, we assume that the banks’ differentiation perceived by 
consumers (parameter  is the same across markets and, thus, it is excluded from the list of 
the explanatory variables for interest rates and volumes of demand.  
In some cases, the time dummy variables will be replaced by macro and other time-
varying variables common to all banks. These include variables such as interbank interest 
rates, price inflation and GDP growth of the Spanish economy and the estimates of average 
productivity for the banking industry, At in [16].   
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4 Empirical models and results 
4.1 Empirical models 
The first group of empirical models correspond to the econometric formulation of equations 
[11], [12], [13], [14] and [15] that explain interest rates of loans and deposits, volume of loans 
and deposits per branch and economic profits per branch.  
The empirical model on the determinants of interest rates is formulated as follows:  
 
[17] 
  
The variable At is the average productivity of the industry at year t defined above; the size of 
the market GDPMarket replaces the number of branches in the relevant market to avoid 
endogeneity problems; the CVt is a vector of time varying control variables. The control 
variables include the ex-post credit risk of bank i in year t calculated as the ratio of loan loss 
provisions over total loans  (only for the interest of loans), and time varying 
variables such as the Interbank interest rate, the GDP growth rate and the consumer price 
index (Inflation). We expect that the coefficients of the variables that capture the relative 
productivity levels of bank i will have signs γ1>0 and γ2<0 for interest on loans and just the 
opposite signs for interest on deposits. The model also predicts a negative (positive) 
association between industry productivity and interest rates of loans (deposits): γ3<0 (>0). 
Closer distance between branches in larger markets implies more intense competition, so we 
expect γ4<0 (>0) in the equation of determinants of interest rates of loans (deposits). The 
effective transmission of monetary policy implies a coefficient of one for the interbank interest 
variable. For robustness purposes, equation [17] will be estimated replacing time varying 
variables by time dummy variables.  
The empirical econometric model on the determinants of volumes of loans, deposits 
and economic profits per branch, is formulated as follows:   
                                                             [18] 
 
From the theory we expect δ1<0, δ2>0 and δ3<0 for all dependent variables. When 
the dependent variable is volume of loans per branch, we also include the variable 
 in [18]. A positive estimated coefficient for this variable will support the 
hypothesis that the credit risk of the loan portfolio and the volume of loans per branch are 
positively correlated because of higher average distance between borrowers and lender.  
All the previous empirical models contain banks fixed effects to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity, ηi. Finally, vit is the stochastic error term. All the variables are 
lagged one period to capture the effect of “at the beginning of the year” and limit the impact 
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of potential endogeneity. The empirical models are estimated with instrumental variables 
including banks’ fixed effects. The measures of relative productivity are instrumented with 
information of lagged market productivity. 
The empirical model on the short-term evolution of branch opening and closing 
decisions [14] is formulated as follows: 
                                                         [19] 
                                                                                                                              
 
This model is estimated with the GMM technique. We consider the relative 
productivity of the bank and future profits as potentially endogenous. Since the dependent 
variable is an increment and contains information of t-1, we define as exogenous variables the 
lag t-2 of total assets, the lags t-2 and t-3 of the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the 
productivity distribution and time dummy variables. To assess the validity of the estimates, we 
provide the p-value of the test of over-identifying restrictions to test the consistency of the 
orthogonality conditions. We estimate the model with the two-step procedure computing 
robust standard errors using the Windmeijer finite-sample correction mechanism. According 
to the predictions of the model, we expect that banks with relatively lower productivity level 
will open a lower number of branches (β2<0) while banks with relatively high productivity level 
will tend to open more branches (β3>0). In parallel, the perspectives of higher future 
profitability will also lead banks to open new branches (β4>0).  
The third block of empirical estimates models the behaviour of the profit per branch 
of the banking system according to Equation [15]. We use panel data of profits per branch as 
dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable and time dummy variables as 
explanatory ones.  The model will be estimated using the GMM technique using the t-2 and t-
3 lags of the dependent variable and the time dummies as instruments. If the zero-profit 
convergence condition is satisfied then the constant and the coefficients of the time dummy 
variables should be equal to zero and the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable should 
be lower than one. Next, we estimate with the first-differenced GMM estimator using the lags 
t-3 and t-4 of the profits in levels, to account for the banks’ fixed effects and test for 
conditional convergence.  
4.2 Results of the estimation 
4.2.1 TESTING PREDICTION P1 
a. Determinants of interest rates of loans and deposits  
The results of the estimation of different specifications of econometric model [17] on 
determinants of the interest rates of loans and deposits are shown in Table 3. In column (1), 
we report the estimated coefficients for the econometric model on loan interest rate. Results 
are in line with the predictions of the theoretical model (summarized at the end of Section 2). 
First, the interest rates of loans depend on the relative level of productivity of the bank and its 
competitors: consistent with the theory, banks in the lower tail of the distribution of 
productivity charge higher interest rates for loans than banks with average productivity. In 
particular, our estimations indicate that low-efficient bank-branches charge 110 basis points 
more to the interest rates of loans than the rest of banks. The estimated coefficient of the 
variable is not statistically significant indicating that banks in the )75( thi pProdvId 
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upper tail of the distribution of productivity do not charge lower interest rates than banks with 
average productivity.  
The coefficient of the industry productivity variable (At) is negative and statistically 
significant (p-value<1%) as predicted in the theoretical model (equation [11]). The contribution 
of the industry productivity growth to the dynamics of the interest rates over time is equal to 
the estimated coefficient of the industry productivity variable multiplied by the observed 
growth rate in productivity reported in Table 2. Performing these calculations, the industry 
gains in productivity have resulted in an accumulated decrease of 1.5 percentage points in 
the interest rate of loans, and an accumulated increase of 0.5 percentage points in the 
interest rate of deposits during the 15 years of the sample period. 
The negative and statistically significant (p-value< 1%) coefficient of the size of the 
relevant market (i.e. GDPMarket) is also consistent with the theoretical predictions. This result 
suggests that there is a higher density of branches in larger markets than in small markets. 
This implies that the distance between branches in large markets is smaller what, in turn, 
increases competition and lowers the average interest rates of the relevant loan market. 
Finally, the interest rates of loans also vary with the risk profile of the bank portfolios captured 
through the explanatory variable of the (ex post) credit risk ratio (i.e. loan provisions on 
assets). The estimated coefficient is positive and statistically significant at 10% level. This is 
the expected result if the ex post credit risk indicator is positively correlated with the ex ante 
credit risk perceived by banks at the time the loan is granted. 
As for the monetary transmission mechanism, the coefficient of the interbank rate is 
positive and significant (p-value<1%). However, the estimated value of the coefficient is lower 
than 1, suggesting frictions in the transmission process. Finally, interest rates of loans are 
counter-cyclical as the estimated coefficient of the GDP growth is negative. 
Column (2) of Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients for the model on the interest 
rates of deposits. As in the case of loans, part of the heterogeneity observed in the interest 
rates reflects differences in productivity across banks. Interests on deposits are 130 basis 
points lower for low-productivity banks than for the average bank (statistically significant at 
1%). Interest rates are positively associated with the average industry productivity, with an 
estimated positive coefficient of 0.024. Next, the monetary transmission mechanism operates 
for deposits too (positive estimated coefficient for the interbank interest rate), though the 
estimated coefficient is lower than in the interest rate of loans, probably due to the 
heterogeneous composition of deposits (liquidity provision and savings vehicle). The 
estimated coefficient for the variable size of the relevant market is not significant and interest 
rates of deposits increase with inflation and decrease with the growth of GDP.  
Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3 show the results when the common time varying 
effects are captured by time-dummy variables. The results are broadly consistent with those 
of columns (1) and (2), although banks interest rates are less sensitive to differences in 
productivity among banks. For deposits, the dummy of high-productivity banks, which pay an 
interest rate 30 basis points higher than the average bank, now captures the relative 
differences in productivity among banks. 
The last two columns of Table 3 allow for differences in the monetary transmission 
mechanism as a function of the productivity of banks (low-productivity banks, high-
productivity banks and rest of the banks). For this purpose, we add the interaction of the 
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bank relative productivity dummy variables and the interbank interest rate as explanatory 
variables. For the loans, the estimated coefficient of the interbank rate is now higher (closer to 
one) than in column (1) while the coefficient of the interacted variable is negative for the low 
productivity banks. This means that banks with low productivity reduce the speed for 
translating changes in the monetary policy to the pricing of loans, creating market 
inefficiencies. The opposite occurs with the transmission to the interest of deposits, that is, 
less productive banks translate changes in the monetary policy to interest rates faster than 
more productive ones, probably because the former face stronger competition in the deposits 
markets from more efficient banks.  
b. Determinants of loans, deposits and economic profits per branch 
The estimations of econometric model [18] on the determinants of loans, deposits and 
economic profits per branch are presented in Table 4. From column (1), banks in the lower 
(upper) tail of the distribution of productivity get a lower (higher) volume of loans per branch: 
the coefficient of  is negative and the coefficient of  
is positive, both significant at 1%. The negative estimated coefficient for the proxy of the size 
of the relevant market is consistent with the prediction that the demand per branch decreases 
with the intensity of competition (more bank branches in the market). 
Ex post credit risk is positively correlated with the volume of loans per branch; since 
more loans per branch implies longer average distance between borrowers and the bank 
branch, then the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that information asymmetries also 
affect the market equilibrium in the banks credit market. The argument that productivity 
increases both loans per branch and the average distance to borrowers implies that credit 
risk from information asymmetries should be higher in more productive than in less productive 
banks. As a robustness exercise, we test this assessment and estimate an econometric 
model using LLP/Assets as dependent variable and banks’ productivity (both absolute and 
relative productivity measures) as explanatory variable. Estimation results confirm the positive 
and significant association between productivity and loan loss provisions, even when 
controlling for loans growth, time effects and bank effects. 
When the dependent variable is the volume of deposits, column (2), the results show 
that banks in the lower tail of the distribution of productivity have a lower volume of deposits 
per branch (p-value<1%). The coefficient for the measure of the size of the market is negative 
and statistically significant (p-value<10%).  
Finally, the column (3) of Table 4 shows the results for the model of economic profits 
per branch. The positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
confirms that higher productivity is rewarded with higher economic profits. The economic 
profits per branch for high-productivity banks are, on average, 307,200 Euros higher than for 
the rest of the banks. Profits per branch decrease with the size of the relevant market, again, 
as expected from the theory.   
Figure 4A represents graphically the estimated coefficients for the time dummy 
variables of the three estimations. The values of the estimated coefficients show the time 
evolution of the volume of loans, deposits and economic profits per branch after controlling 
for the effects of the other explanatory variables and capture industry and macroeconomic 
conditions common to all banks. Loans and deposits per branch are in logs and so are the 
time trend values (left scale). Economic profits per branch are in thousands of Euros. The time 
trend in loans grows at a relatively constant rate since 1996, when Spain started the nominal 
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convergence to become member of the Euro zone and monetary conditions started to relax, 
with lower official interest rates.  Deposits per branch grew at moderate rates until year 2000 
and at higher rates after this year. The time trend of loans is above the trend in deposits from 
2003 on, generating a liquidity gap that was financed with funds raised in wholesale markets. 
The time trend in profits per branch started at negative values and stayed in values around 
zero from 1996 to 2003, turning positive for the rest of the sample years.  
Wrapping up, Tables 3 and 4 support the predictions of Prediction 1 of the 
theoretical model. These results confirm that the productivity of banks affects their interest 
rates of loans and deposits, as well as their volume of demand per branch. Higher 
productivity is associated with lower (higher) interest rates of loans (deposits) and higher 
demand for banking services. Higher productivity is rewarded with higher economic profits 
per branch. Interest rates of loans (deposits) are lower (higher) in larger markets, i.e. in 
markets with higher volume of demand for bank services. Demand per branch and economic 
profits per branch however, are negatively correlated with the size of the relevant market. The 
positive time trend in loans and deposits per branch over the period of study is consistent 
with a period of decreasing interest rates and unit margins: as the gross profit margin 
decreases, the volume of demand per branch must increase to break-even. During 2004-
2007, average profits per branch turn positive and with positive growth rate. This could be 
explained because banks finance the liquidity gap with securitization and wholesale–market 
financing, which entail low or zero fixed-cost per branch.   
4.2.2 TESTING PREDICTION P2 
The second set of hypotheses refers to the determinants of the changes in the number of 
branches of individual banks, as formulated in econometric model [19]. Estimation results are 
reported in Table 5. They correspond to two specifications of the basic model, which has 
been estimated with two-step robust GMM. The specifications differ in the procedure used to 
estimate the expected industry economic profits per branch in period t+1. In column (1) they 
are estimated using the full sample information while the estimation in column (2) only uses 
information available at t-1. The statistical tests reject the null hypothesis of over-identifying 
restrictions 
Results are very similar in both cases. The estimated coefficient for 
is negative and significant (p-value <1%) and the coefficient for the 
forecasted economic profits per branch is positive and statistically significant (p value<1%). 
The empirical results confirm that expectations on industry economic profits per branch drive 
the expansion of the branch network for all banks and that the less productive banks, on 
average, expand their network in 15 branches per year less than the rest of banks.  
Figure 4B shows that the estimated coefficients of the time dummy variables in the 
estimations of columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, which capture the year-industry average change 
in the number of branches. First, it is decreasing until 1998; then, it stabilizes around zero, 
until 2003 and, finally, it increases again until 2007. The comparison of Figure 4B and Figure 
4A reveals that the average industry change in the number of branches in Figure 4B is 
negative during the years of negative economic profits per branch; they are around zero when 
average profits are also zero; and the average change in the number of branches is positive 
when average industry economic profits are also positive.  
The contraction in the number of branches during the first period when the average 
industry economic profits are negative just indicates that the number of bank branches was 
)Prodv( i
th25pId 
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too high and price competition intense. Under this situation, banks reacted reducing the stock 
of branches until the average profits reached a value close to zero. Then, the situation 
stabilized for several years, when profits remained around zero and the average change in the 
number of branches was also around zero. Starting in 2003, the profits per branch and the 
number of branches increased in parallel. In this period, the volume of deposits was lower 
than the volume of loans and Spanish banks relied on securitization and wholesale markets 
finance to close the liquidity gap (Figure 4A). The business model of Spanish banks changed 
and deposits collected by the branch network no longer were the only source of lending 
funds. The logic of more branches, more competition and lower profits broke down and 
economic profits per branch grew at the same time that the network of branches was 
expanding in an explosive way.  
4.2.3 TESTING PREDICTION P3 
We now test for the zero-profit condition for the banking industry using bank-level data. The 
results of the GMM estimation of equation [15] with time dummies and not controlling for 
banks’ fixed effects are presented in column (1) of Table 6. The null hypothesis that the 
constant and the coefficients of the time dummy variables are all equal to zero cannot be 
rejected. In addition, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is smaller than 1 (p-value<5%). These results can be interpreted as 
evidence in favor of convergence of economic profits per branch towards zero for the 
Spanish banking industry. However, the large magnitude of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable (0.86) implies a slow process of convergence, since it will take up to 7 
years (1/(1-0.86)) converging to zero profits. 
In the specification reported in column (2) that controls for unobserved heterogeneity 
including banks’ fixed effects, the estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable is 
equal to 0.6, which is lower (p value <5%) than the estimated value in column (1). The 
magnitude of the difference between these two coefficients supports the hypothesis of 
conditional convergence. That is, we cannot reject that each bank converges towards an 
idiosyncratic level of economic profits per branch. The estimated speed of convergence is 
now faster, 2.5 year (1/(1-0.6)). Finally, in column (3), we show the estimation of the model of 
unconditional convergence allowing for different speed of adjustment in branch profits for the 
periods before and after the Euro. The estimated coefficient associated to the interaction term 
is not statistically significant and, thus, there is no evidence of a different speed of 
convergence between the pre- and the post-Euro years.  
The estimated fixed effects in the model of dynamics in economic profits per bank-
branch can be interpreted as an estimate of the long-term profits for a particular bank 
resulting from its unique competitive advantage (or disadvantage). The examination of these 
fixed effects gives additional insights on the characteristics of the industry dynamics. First, we 
compare the average value of the fixed effects of banks that survive until 2007 with that of 
banks that disappear because of M&A during the sample period. Results give an average 
profit of -100,700 Euros per branch for the banks that disappear and of 33,810 Euros per 
branch for those that continue in 2007. This difference is statistically significant (p value <1%). 
Therefore, as expected from the effects of competitive selection (Wheelock and Wilson, 
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2000), banks that leave the industry (61 out of 150) are those with negative expectations on 
long–term profits10.  
Second, we find that the average fixed effects of the 89 surviving banks is not 
statistically different from zero, so industry average profits remain around zero in the long-
term. However, differences among continuing banks are not totally random, as we find that 
the estimated fixed-effects are positively correlated (correlation value of 32.2%, p-value < 5%) 
with long-term estimated differences in productivity per branch-bank. Additionally, we find no 
significant differences between banks and saving banks. According to size categories, we find 
that, once differences in long-term productivity are controlled for, large banks are only slightly 
(10,000 Euros per branch) more profitable in the long run than medium and small banks (p 
value <10%). Therefore, the evidence suggests that permanent differences in economic 
profits per branch-bank are tied to idiosyncratic characteristics of banks, not particularly 
related to size or ownership, the same that cause permanent differences in productivity. 
Finally, the fact that some banks that survive in 2007 have estimated fixed effects negative 
and significant indicates that the survival of these banks is at risk.  
                                                                          
10. Mergers and acquisitions will imply transfers of banking operations from less efficient to more efficient banks, 
lowering costs and interest rates, according to the model. Since our operating and competition unit is the bank-branch, 
mergers and acquisitions are not expected to affect the market power or collusive behavior of banks. Erel (2011) finds 
evidence that mergers of banks reduce interest rates of loans but only while the cost savings effects dominate the 
market power effects, so market structure also matter as a determinant of the interest rates of loans.  
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5 Conclusion  
This paper models the static and dynamic Nash equilibrium in interest rates, market shares, 
and economic profits of banks competing in spatially differentiated markets, with free entry 
and exit of branches. The equilibrium values of these variables are explained as a function of 
bank-branch productivity. Productivity is obtained from the estimation of the production 
function of bank services, in which labor and IT capital are considered variable inputs and the 
capacity of the bank-branch is considered a fixed input. The predictions of the theoretical 
model posited in the paper are tested with data from Spanish banks. Both, the theoretical 
model and the empirical results confirm that productivity is an important driver of the 
observed heterogeneity in prices, market shares and profits of banks. The results also confirm 
that the (Nash) competition among banks (including entry of new branches) translates 
productivity differences (across banks) and productivity growth (over time) into benefits for the 
banks’ clients.  
A remarkable empirical finding of this paper is that the productivity gains of the 
banking industry are translated into changes in the interest rates of loans and deposits. 
During the 1993-2007 period, an increase of one point in the productivity of the Spanish 
banking industry implied a reduction (increment) in the interest rates of loans (deposits) of 
around 3.1 basis points (1.1bp). Since the estimated average annual rate of productivity 
growth was around 3.0% (Table 2), loan interest rates decreased an average of 9.4 bp per 
year (1.41pp accumulated during the whole period). For deposits, productivity growth 
translates into a yearly increase of 3.48 basis points in the interest rates (0.52pp accumulated 
during the sample period). Social benefits from lower intermediation costs in the Spanish 
banking industry occur at the same time that the industry undertakes a process of 
concentration with a substantial reduction of the number of banks. This confirms the 
relevance of the bank-branch competition to explain the industry performance.  
One lesson from the paper is that positive gross profit margins (as, for example, the 
Lerner index higher than zero) can be compatible with competitive market conditions (i.e., 
zero long-run economic profits in the bank industry) if banks have fixed operating costs from 
their branch network. In fact, the market power resulting from differentiation among banks 
(i.e., spatial differentiation) is necessary to earn gross profits and to cover the fixed costs.  
The structural change of the dynamics of bank-branches in Spain after the Euro can 
be explained (at least in part) by changes in the operating conditions of banks. Once in the 
Euro, the available deposits collected through the branch network no longer act as a 
constraint to grant bank loans. The reason is that the Euro granted the access of Spanish 
banks to international wholesale and interbank markets. In this new scenario, differences in 
productivity at the bank-branch level are less important to determine the competitive 
advantage of banks. The reason is that banks are less and less dependent of their network of 
branches and, as a consequence, spatial competition becomes less important to explain the 
growth rate of banks’ activity. 
Results of the paper open several lines of future research. The preliminary evidence 
found in the paper supporting a positive association between credit risk and the volume of loans 
per branch as well as between credit risk and the productivity of banks, suggests that credit risk 
increases with average distance what is expected under imperfect information. Then one 
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extension of the spatial competition model should be explicitly extended to account for 
information asymmetries in the credit market and how they interact with distance between 
borrowers and lenders in determining the interest of loans and the credit risk of the portfolio of 
loans. Another extension of the paper is in modeling the equilibrium in the number of branches 
in each spatial market (province in our case) from entry and exit decisions by banks, which will 
require modeling the profit opportunities in each regional market. Finally, it will be interesting to 
examine how differences in the productivity of banks before the crisis conditioned the 
performance of banks in the years of the crisis, in terms of survival, need of public aid, etc. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1426 
REFERENCES 
AGARWAL, S. and R. HAUSWALD (2010): “Distance and private information in lending,” Review of Financial Studies, vol. 
23 (7), pp. 2757-2788. 
AGUIRREGABIRIA, V., CLARK, R. & WANG, H. (2012). “Diversification of geographic risk in retail bank networks: 
Evidence from bank expansion after the Riegle-Neal act”. Working Paper 465, University of Toronto 
ALBERTAZZI, U. and L. GAMBACORTA (2009): "Bank profitability and the business cycle," Journal of Financial Stability, 
vol. 5 (4), pp. 393-409. 
ALLEN, F. and D. GALE (2004): “Competition and financial stability,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 36 (3), 
pp. 453-480. 
ATHANASOGLOU, P. P, S. N. BRISSIMIS and M. D. DELISC (2008): “Bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of bank profitability,” Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, vol. 18 (2), pp. 121–136. 
BERGER, A. N. and T. H. HANNAN (1998): “The Efficiency Cost Of Market Power In The Banking Industry: A Test Of The 
"Quiet Life" And Related Hypotheses,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 80 (3), pp. 454-465. 
BERGER, A., I. HASAN and L. KLAPPER (2004): "Further Evidence on the Link between Finance and Growth: An 
International Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Performance," Journal of Financial Services Research, 
vol. 25 (2), pp. 169-202. 
BERGER, A. N., J. H. LEUSNER, and J. J. MINGO (1997): “The efficiency of bank branches,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 
vol. 40 (1), pp. 141-162. 
BERGER, A. N. and L. J. MESTER (2003): "Explaining the dramatic changes in performance of US banks: technological 
change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12 (1), 
pp. 57-95. 
BORIO, C. and H. ZHU (2012): “Capital regulation, risk-taking and monetary policy: a missing link in the transmission 
mechanism?”, Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 8, pp. 236-251. 
BOURKE, P. (1989): “Concentration and other determinants of bank profitability in Europe, North America and Australia,” 
Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 13, pp. 65-79. 
BOYD, J. H. and G. DE NICOLÓ (2005): “The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited,” The Journal of 
Finance, vol. 60, pp. 1329-1343. 
CARBÓ, S., D. HUMPHREY, J. MAUDOS and P. MOLYNEUX (2009): “Cross country comparisons of competition and 
pricing power in European banking,” Journal of International Money and Finance, vol. 28 (1), pp. 115-134. 
CARBÓ, S. and F. RODRÍGUEZ (2007): “The determinants of bank margins in European Banking,” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, vol. 31, pp. 2043-2063. 
COHEN, A. M. and MAZZEO, M. (2007): “Market structure and competition among retail depository institutions”, Review 
of Economics and Statistics 89(1), pp. 60-74 
DE BONDT, G. (2005): “Interest rate pass-through in the euro area,” German Economic Review, vol. 6 (1), pp. 37-78. 
DEGRYSE, H., and S. ONGENA (2005): “Distance, lending relationships, and competition,” The Journal of Finance, vol. 60 
(1), pp. 231-266. 
DICK, A. A. (2006). "Nationwide branching and its impact on market structure, quality and bank performance," Journal of 
Business, vol. 79 (2), pp. 567-592. 
EREL, I. (2011): “The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices: Evidence from the United States,” Review of Financial 
Studies, vol. 24 (4), pp. 1068-1101.  
FERNÁNDEZ DE GUEVARA, J. and J. MAUDOS (2007): “The cost of market power in the European banking sectors: 
social welfare loss vs. inefficiency cost,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 31 (7), pp. 2103-2125.  
FIORDELISI F (2007): “Shareholder value efficiency in European banking,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 31, pp. 
2151–2171. 
FIORDELISI F., D. MARQUES-IBANEZ and P. MOLYNEUX (2011): “Efficiency and Risk in European Banking,” Journal of 
Banking and Finance, vol. 35 (5), pp. 1315-1326. 
FREIXAS, X. and K. MA (2014): “Bank competition and stability: The role of leverage”. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484500 
HAUSWALD, R., and R. MARQUEZ (2006): “Competition and strategic information acquisition in credit markets,” Review 
of Financial Studies, vol. 19 (3), pp. 967-1000. 
HELLMANN, T. F., K. C. MURDOCK and J. E. STIGLITZ (2000): “Liberalization, moral hazard in banking, and prudential 
regulation: Are capital requirements enough?,” American Economic Review, vol. 90 (1), pp. 147-165. 
HO, K. and ISHII, J. (2011): “Location and competition in retail banking”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 
29(5), pp. 537-546. 
JARAYATNE, J. and P. E. STRAHAN (1996): “The finance-growth nexus: Evidence from the bank branch deregulation,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 111 (3), pp. 639-669. 
JIMÉNEZ, G., J. L. LÓPEZ y J. SAURINA (2013): “How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk Taking?,” Journal of Financial 
Stability, vol. 9, pp. 185-195. 
KASHYAP, A. K. and J. C. STEIN (2000): "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of 
Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, vol. 90 (3), pp. 407-428. 
KEELEY, M. C. (1990): “Deposit insurance, risk and market power in banking,” American Economic Review, vol. 80, pp. 
1183-1200. 
KOETTER, M. and F. NOTH (2013): “IT use, productivity, and market power in banking,” Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 
9, pp. 695-704. 
LEVINSOHN, J. and A. PETRIN (2003): “Estimating Production Functions Using Inputs to Control for Unobservables,” 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70 (2), pp. 317-341. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 30 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1426 
MARTÍN-OLIVER, A., S. RUANO and V. SALAS-FUMÁS (2013): "Why high productivity growth of banks preceded the 
financial crisis," Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 22, pp. 688-712.  
MARTÍN-OLIVER, A. and V. SALAS-FUMÁS (2008): “The output and profit contribution of information technology and 
advertising investments in Banks,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 17, pp. 229-255. 
MARTÍN-OLIVER, A., SALAS-FUMÁS, V. and SAURINA, J. (2007): “Measurement of capital stock and input services of 
Spanish Banks,” working paper 0711, Bank of Spain. 
MATUTES, C. and X. VIVES (2000): “Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking,” European Economic 
Review, vol. 44, pp.1-34. 
MIRZAEI, A., T. MOORE and G. LIU (2013): “Does market structure matter on banks’ profitability and stability? Emerging 
vs. advanced economies,” Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 37 (8), pp 2920–2937. 
MOJON, B. (2000): "Financial structure and the interest rate channel of ECB monetary policy," Working Paper Series 
0040, European Central Bank. 
NEMANJA, R.; F. FIORDELISI and C. GIRARDONE (2012): “Efficiency and Risk-Taking in Pre-Crisis Investment Banks,” 
Journal of Financial Services Research, vol. 41, pp. 81–101. 
PETERSEN, M. A. and R. G. RAJAN (2002): “Does distance still matter? The information revolution in small business 
lending,” Journal of Finance, vol. 57 (6), pp. 2533-2570. 
PINHO, P. (2000): “The impact of deregulation on price and non-price competition in the Portuguese deposits market,” 
Journal of Banking & Finance, vol. 24 (9), pp. 1515-33. 
REPULLO, R. 2004. “Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
vol. 13, pp. 156-182. 
SALAS, V. and J. SAURINA (2003): “Deregulation, market power and risk behavior in Spanish banks,” European 
Economic Review, vol. 47, pp. 1061-1075. 
SALOP, S. C. (1979): “Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods,” Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 10, pp. 141-156  
SCHLÜTER, T., T. HARTMANN-WENDELS, R. BUSCH and S. SIEVERS (2012): “Determinants of the interest rate pass-
through of banks. Evidence on German loan products,” Discussion Paper No. 26/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank. 
SYVERSON, CH. (2011): "What Determines Productivity?" Journal of Economic Literature, 49(2), pp. 326-365 
WHEELOCK, D. C. and P.W. WILSON (2000): “Why do banks disappear? The determinants of US bank failures and 
acquisitions,” Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 2 (1), pp. 127-138. 
  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1426 
APPENDIX  
                       Table A1. Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
 
 
Raw Productivity It is calculated as the difference between the observed and the predicted output. We estimate the parameters of the production function for
the representative technology at the branch level production function as in Martín‐Oliver et al. (2013) following a production approach. Inputs of
the production function are labour, IT and physical capital services and output is multiple including the collection of deposits. Raw productivity is
decomposed in the sum of three components as follows: Raw Productivityit=At+Xit’+Ait. Where At denotes the average productivity for the whole
banking industry, the vector of control variables (Xit) accounts for other sources of heterogeneity different from productivity and, as a residual,
productivity of bank i in year t denoted as Ait. It is expressed in logs.
Banking industry productivity The average productivity for the whole banking industry in year t (At) is the coefficient associated to the time dummy that takes value 1 if the
observation belongs to year t in the regression of raw productivity on a set of time dummies and a vector of control variables. It is expressed in
logs.
Total Factor Productivity It is also refered in the paper as "productivity" of firm i in year t is obtained as a residual (Ait) in the regression of raw porductivity on a set of
industry dummy variables and a vector of control variables. It is expressed in logs. We define two dummy variables that classify banks according to
their relative level of productivity: Id(Prodv i <p25
th ) and  Id(Prodv i >p75
th )
 Id(Prodv i <p25 th ) Identifier of high relative productivity that takes value 1 if the bank's productivity in yeart is under the 25th percentile of the distribution of
productivity of bank i 's competitors in its relevant markets and zero otherwise.
 Id(Prodv i >p75 th ) Identifier of low relative productivity that takes value 1 if the bank's productivity in yeart is higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution of
productivity for competitors of bank i in its relevant markets and zero otherwise.
Relevant market of bank i The relevant market for bank i  is composed by all the provinces in which the bank has at least 5 branches.
Size of the relevant market 
(GDPMarket)
It equals to the sum of GDPs of each province that belongs to the relevant market of bank i.
Balance sheet and income 
statement control variables
Information on variables such as ,total Assets, Equity , Loans, deposits, accountant profits and interest rates is collected from the financial
statements that Banco de España records for regulatory and supervisory purposes. Stock variables have been transformed to be expressed at
replacement costs.
Number of branches  It is drawn from the Branches Registry of Banco de España, which contains the location of all bank branches in Spain at the municipal level. For
every bank and year, we consider the total number of branches. 
Profits per branch We consider economic profits, which are first calculated at the bank level. Next, the economic profits of the bank in year t are divided by the
number of branches of the bank at the end of year t to obtain the economic profit per branch of bank i in year t. The measure of economics
profits is calculated from accounting profits after i) adding expenditures in IT and advertising, which are considered as investment flows and,
consequently, must be substracted from the accountant costs of the year ii) substracting the opportunity cost of equity (not considered as a
financial cost in the calculation of accounting profits).
Expected profits per branch  Expected values of the numerator (economic profits) and the denominator (number of branches) are calculated separately for every bank and
year. Then, predictions for every bank and year are aggregated at the country level in each year to obtain the series for the average bank for the
whole banking industry. Finally, we divide the aggregates of the expected economic profits at time t and of the number of branches at time t, to
obtain the prediction of the average economic profits per branch for the whole banking industry in year t. Forecasts of future (economic) profits
per branch in period t+1 and of the number of branches in period t+1 are computed in two alternative manners: 1) using all the information of
the sample available at time t; 2) using the information available until time t‐1.
Loans (deposits) per branch The stock of loans (deposits)  are valued at constant prices following the permanent inventory method, with depreciation equal to zero and price 
inflation equal to the the growth rate of the consumer price index. The stock of loans (deposits) is divided by the number of branches of the
bank ante the end of the year.
Interest rates of loans (deposits) 
for bank i in year t
We consider the interest rates charged by banks in new loans and deposits (marginal interest rates) . Average of 12‐monthly data for a given
year.
LLP/Assets   It is a measure of expost credit risk defined as the flow of loan loss provisions over the volume of loans, both for bank i at the end of year t.
Real GDP growth Annual growth rate of teal GDP
Interbank rate Real Interbank rate defined as 12‐month nominal interbank interest rate minus inflation rate.
Inflation Annual growth rate of the consumer price index.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of economic profits, volume of loans and volume of deposits per branch 
 
Note: All variables expressed in thousands of constant Euros of 1992. 
  
Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev. Average Median Std. Dev.
Economic Profit per Branch Volume of Loans per Branch Volume of Deposits per Branch
1992 -276.8 -38.12 649.3 15,848 5,673 31,644 11,386 7,674 13,840
1993 -243.8 -40.95 590.2 16,873 5,425 32,959 12,308 7,740 16,651
1994 -279.2 -26.19 664.2 17,042 5,866 33,823 13,134 7,869 18,158
1995 -292.4 -27.62 655.7 18,923 6,056 38,072 14,391 7,976 21,260
1996 -177.6 -17.65 540.8 18,233 6,634 35,790 15,304 8,539 22,413
1997 -178.5 4.575 571.3 20,260 7,255 36,854 15,780 9,213 21,319
1998 -128.6 32.28 601.6 21,944 8,129 38,302 16,565 9,525 22,945
1999 -146.7 44.02 617.3 21,855 8,476 37,353 15,435 9,502 20,319
2000 -162.2 28.13 658.8 21,392 9,344 34,273 18,436 10,378 23,476
2001 -160.3 22.72 661.2 22,823 9,915 36,865 21,114 11,468 26,673
2002 -134.0 22.63 594.5 23,496 11,005 36,087 22,474 12,412 27,255
2003 -163.3 15.45 622.7 25,488 12,538 38,299 21,346 12,792 26,543
2004 -98.96 19.73 547.3 27,442 14,058 38,609 22,189 13,617 26,902
2005 -51.08 21.53 472.5 30,019 17,005 38,298 24,338 15,224 27,931
2006 -14.93 34.08 490.5 33,063 18,733 38,519 26,532 16,666 28,014
2007 40.90 40.94 365.7 35,854 20,620 39,944 27,347 17,685 28,102
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Table 2. Number of banks, number of branches and time varying explanatory variables 
 
 
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
1992 143 223.0 454.9 0.744 0.804 108,666 76,048 7.38% 0.9% 3.54% 7.457
1993 141 221.9 421.4 0.899 1.087 117,501 81,636 6.34% -1.0% 5.92% 7.526
1994 137 231.8 431.2 0.794 1.194 132,704 90,454 3.73% 2.4% 4.57% 7.485
1995 138 236.5 445.1 0.450 0.673 152,969 103,965 5.32% 2.8% 4.72% 7.510
1996 133 250.6 475.2 0.327 0.353 170,017 112,879 3.80% 2.4% 4.67% 7.533
1997 131 260.3 496.1 0.214 0.196 185,808 123,377 3.23% 3.9% 3.56% 7.606
1998 125 280.0 535.4 0.183 0.246 222,033 139,640 2.17% 4.5% 1.97% 7.607
1999 121 290.6 595.1 0.307 0.874 250,224 153,124 0.84% 4.7% 1.83% 7.598
2000 113 309.7 663.0 0.320 0.366 284,424 177,583 1.33% 5.0% 2.31% 7.682
2001 108 319.1 653.7 0.366 0.351 323,247 199,831 0.48% 3.6% 3.43% 7.669
2002 103 332.4 650.3 0.391 0.422 369,641 217,734 0.42% 2.7% 3.59% 7.729
2003 97 353.4 674.4 0.474 0.819 411,952 240,666 -0.69% 3.1% 3.07% 7.704
2004 94 377.6 695.4 0.330 0.276 451,631 262,814 -0.73% 3.3% 3.04% 7.728
2005 93 395.4 727.3 0.303 0.264 529,902 298,693 -1.03% 3.6% 3.01% 7.784
2006 92 416.2 757.0 0.305 0.218 614,128 339,968 -0.08% 3.9% 3.37% 7.886
2007 90 443.1 792.1 0.376 0.289 706,662 376,953 1.66% 3.8% 3.52% 7.9140.02787 4.26086
Inflation Industry Productivity
No. of 
banks
Number of Branches LLP/Assets (x100) GDP Market (m€) Real 
Interbank GDPG
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       Table 3. Estimation of equations [11] and [12]: Determinants of interest rates 
 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Standard Errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at bank level. 
(***)=significant at 1%, (**)=significant at 5%, (*)=significant at 10% 
  
Id(Prodv.<P25th)t‐1 0.011 ** ‐0.013 *** 0.009 ** ‐0.004 0.015 ** ‐0.018 ***
Id(Prodv.>P75th)t‐1 0.003 ‐0.006 0.002 0.003 * 0.006 ‐0.009
Industry Productivity ‐0.031 *** 0.011 * ‐0.033 *** 0.014 **
Interbank x Id(Prodv.<P25th)t‐1 ‐0.283 ** 0.346 ***
Interbank x Id(Prodv.>P75th)t‐1 ‐0.190 0.193 *
LLP / Assetst‐1 0.081 * 0.074 * 0.084 *
ln(GDP Market) ‐0.004 *** ‐0.001 ‐0.004 *** 0.000 ‐0.003 *** ‐0.001
Interbank rate 0.732 *** 0.667 *** 0.857 *** 0.528 ***
GDP Growth ‐0.004 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.003 ***
Inflation 0.745 0.433 *** 0.740 *** 0.437 ***
No. of obs 1456 1479 1461 1487 1456 1479
R2 88.74% 88.84% 89.29% 92.95% 88.87% 92.95%
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO
(0.006)
(0.001) (0.640)
(0.045) (0.027) (0.044) (0.026)
(0.030) (0.024) (0.075) (0.061)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
(0.132) (0.111)
(0.046) (0.045) (0.044)
(0.141) (0.118)
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (1.760) (0.007) (0.006)
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
(6)
Loan   
Interest Rate
Deposit 
Interest Rate
Loan   
Interest Rate
Deposit 
Interest Rate
Loan   
Interest Rate
Deposit 
Interest Rate
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 4. Estimation of equation [18] for the determinants of the demands 
 of loans and deposits per branch and of the economic profits per branch. 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at bank level. Estimation with instrumental variables. Instrumented 
variables: Identifier of low relative productivity, Id(Prodv.<25th), and identifier of 
high relative productivity, Id(Prodv.<25th). Instruments: Percentile 25th, 50th and 
75th of the distribution of competitors’ productivity. Time dummy variables 
represented in Figure 4A (***)=significant at 1%, (**)=significant at 5%, 
(*)=significant at 10% 
  
Id(Prodv.<P25th)t‐1 ‐0.584 *** ‐0.576 *** ‐8.320
Id(Prodv.>P75th)t‐1 0.405 *** 0.114 307.2 ***
LLP / Assetst‐1 7.953 **
ln(GDP Market) ‐0.086 ** ‐0.062 * ‐55.612 **
No. of obs
R2
Fixed Effects
Time dummies
78.96%
YES
YES
(2)(1)
(0.033)
(0.127)
(0.181)
Loans per 
Branch
(0.166)
1525
61.61%
YES
YES
1525
85.75%
YES
YES
1525
(3)
Dependent Variable: Profits per 
Branch
Deposits per 
Branch
(26.23)
(119.1)
(138.7)
(0.034)
(3.260)
(0.126)
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    Table 5. Estimation of equation [19] on the growth in the number of branches 
 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Estimation (1): Forecast of profits per 
branch computed using all the information of the sample. Estimation (2): 
Forecast for t+1 computed with the information available until t-1. Estimation 
with two-step GMM, standard errors robust computing Windmeijer finite-
sample correction. List of instruments: log of total assets in t-2, productivity 
from t-2 to t-4 and time dummy variables (represented in Figure 4B). 
Instruments: Percentile 25th, 50th and 75th of the distribution of competitors’ 
productivity. (***)=significant at 1%, (**)=significant at 5%, (*)=significant at 
10% 
  
Id(Prodv.<P25th)t‐1 ‐15.210 *** ‐15.223 ***
Id(Prodv.>P75th)t‐1 ‐5.693 ‐5.510
Profit per Brancht+1 0.082 *** 0.0690 ***
Overidentifying 
restrictions  (p ‐value)
Time Dummies
No. of obs
(4.464)(4.447)
(3.360)(3.514)
Dependent Var: (2)(1) BranchesBranches
YESYES
14621462
(0.018)(0.017)
0.7510.482
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        Table 6. Estimation of [15]: Time dynamics of economic profits per branch 
 
Note: Standard Errors in parentheses. Estimation (1) and (3) estimated with 
GMM-panel data techniques without controlling for bank fixed effects. 
Instruments: dependent variable lagged at t-3 and t-4 and time-dummy variables. 
Estimation (2) controls for fixed-effects using GMM, differentiating the dependent 
variable and using as instruments the lags t-3 and t-4 of the level of profits. 
(***)=significant at 1%, (**)=significant at 5%, (*)=significant at 10% 
  
Ec Profit t‐1 0.861 *** 0.602 *** 0.600 ***
(0.060) (0.093) (0.097)
Id (year>1999)xEc Profit t‐1  ‐0.130
(0.096)
CONTROL FIXED EFFECTS?
TIME DUMMIES 
No. of obs 1690
(1)
NO
1527 1527
YES
(2)
YES
(3)
YES
YES YES
 Figure 1. Distributions of productivity 
 
A. All Banks B. Own and Competitors’ 
productivity 
Figure 1A presents the distribution of our measure of productivity, Ait. Values are centered around 
zero because they come from the residuals of regression (16). Figure 1B presents presents the 
distribution of productivity for the banks that are located below the 25th percentile and above the 
75th percentile of the total distribution of productivity 
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                       Table A1. Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 Figure 2. Evolution of the bank-level distribution of interest rates over time in the banking 
industry  
 
A. Loan Interest Rates B.Deposit Interest Rates 
Figure 2A (2B) present the evolution of the average, median, 25th percentile and 75th percentile of 
the marginal loan (deposits) interest rates quoted by banks during a given year. It also present the 
coefficient of variation (ratio of standard deviation to average) 
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                       Table A1. Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 Figure 3. Industry distribution of the rate of return and the economic profits per bank-branch 
 
A. Economic profits on equity B. Economic profits per branch 
Note: Units in terms of 1 
             in the x-axis 
Note: th€ in the x-axis 
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                       Table A1. Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
 
 
 Figure 4. Estimated values of coefficients for time dummies 
 
A. Time dummies from Table 4:  
Demand and profits per branch             
B. Time dummies from Table 5:  
Growth of branches 
Figure 4A (4B) present the value of the time dummy variables obtained from the estimation 
presented in Table 4 (Table 5) 
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                       Table A1. Definition of the variables used in the analysis 
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